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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
time."5 8g Absent special circumstances, it does not seem from either the Federal
or State definitions that the mere taking of title is such a limitation on the
free use and enjoyment of property as to constitute a taking which requires
compensation. 59 The holding of this case, that the unsuspected loss of legal title
to land without loss of possession does not require compensation in the form of
the interest on the principal obligation except to the extent permitted by
statute, is consistent with this conclusion. If the claimant has knowledge, he
may file a claim and interest runs from the time of such filing. Section 19
seems to go a step further than is constitutionally required, and gives interest
on a claim for six months where title is transferred to the State under the High-
way Law, even if claimant has no knowledge of the appropriation.
EMINENT DOMAIN-CoNTRACTuAL EXEMPTION
In Society of the New York Hospital v. Johnson,60 a bill for injunctive
relief was against the State Superintendent of Public Works. The Society of
the New York Hospital Argued that it had a contractual exemption from the
exercise of eminent domain upon its hospital lands, as manifested by special
statute of 1927, which had neither been expressly nor impliedly repealed.01
The Superintendent, while conceding the exemption rested upon contract and
there had been no express repeal, contended that the simultaneous enactment
of an amendment to the charter of the City of White Plains, prohibiting the
taking of the Society's hospital lands, 2 indicated that the statute upon which
58. 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1957). U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; "No person shall be . . .
deprived of . . . property without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." The provision for just compensation
is applicable to the states through the 14th Amendment; Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226 (1897).
59. "May we say that . . . what he does not know does not hurt him?" from
dissenting opinion, supra note 51 at 746. The dissent suggests that a condemnee may be
hurt: (1) he may unknowingly improve the land, (2) he may be a paying tenant of the
State whether he likes it or not, (3) he may be deprived of time to seek new premises.
Also, the condemnee may be subject to damages if he unknowingly makes a contract
to sell land the title to which is in the State.
60. 5 N.Y.2d 102, 180 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1958).
61. N.Y. SEss. LAws 1927, c. 659, § 1 provides;
. . . No street or avenue or road shall hereafter be laid out or opened
through or upon any of the lands and premises in the City of White
Plains, lying between Mamaroneck Avenue, Bloomingdale Road, West-
chester Avenue, North Street, The St. Agnes Home, Land of Daniel
Maloney and the Burke Foundation, and none of said land shall be taken
for any use whenever and so long as the same shall be owned or occupied
for hospital purposes by the Society of the New York Hospital, provided
however, that the said The Society of The New York Hospital shall
dedicate, without claim or award for damages, for street purposes, the
following parcels of land, and shall, in addition thereto, provide one
hundred and fifty thousand dollars for the paving and regulating of the
street described in said parcels one and two ....
62. N.Y. SEss. LAws 1927, c. 653, provided an amendment to the Charter of White
Plains in the following substance:
It shall be unlawful to open any streets through the grounds belong-
ing to The Society of The New York Hospital, now occupied by Bloom-
ingdale Hospital as long as the same is owned or occupied for hospital
purposes.
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the Society relied was to operate as a bar against the City only. In the alterna-
tive, the Superintendent argued, any applicability of the 1927 statute to the
exercise of State power was ended by subsequent amendments to the New York
State Highway Law, particularly Sections 30 and 340-b, which empower him
to acquire property, ".. . notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of... any
other law, general or special. .... -63
The Court of Appeals applied the established principle of strict construc-
tion of statutes delegating the exercise of the power of eminent domain,64 and
construed the language relied upon by the Superintendent as directing the
manner in which the Superintendent's power was to be exercised. 65 Although,
the Court agreed that the power of eminent domain is an attribute of sov-
ereignty, 66 which cannot be surrendered or permanently alienated,67 it held
that the 1927 Legislature's contract prohibiting the exercise of eminent domain
with respect to the hospital's lands was applicable, as a matter of construction,
to State authorities, and though the contract could be abrogated at the will
of the legislature, such abrogation is effected only by clear language. 68 Thus,
the Court read Section 340-b to mean that notwithstanding any inconsistent
present or prior law, general or special, such lands as the Superintendent is
empowered to acquire by the exercise of eminent domain, shall be acquired
pursuant to the present procedural provisions of the Highway Law.
Although no impairment of contract is occasioned by an exercise of
eminent domain, with compensation, upon lands previously exempted by legis-
lative contract,6 9 some stability and integrity of such contracts is afforded
through requiring a clear showing of present legislative design to avoid the
contract of an earlier legislature. This principle seems especially appropriate
in the instant situation since the legislative direction 'to the Superintendent is
for a route passing ". . . through or northerly of. ... " o, the City of White
63. N.Y. HIGHWAY LAW § 30(15a), provides that notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of the section, the Superintendant of Public Works shall have the power to acquire
by grant or purchase, in the name of the People of the State of New York, any property
he deems necessary for the purposes provided for in the section. The section then outlines
a map-filing procedure for the exercise of the Superintendant's power. N.Y. IonwAy LAW
§ 340-b(3), provides:
Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of this chapter or any other
law, general or special, any and all property which the Superintendant of
Public Works deems necessary for the construction, reconstruction, and
maintenance of interstate highways and bridges thereon shall be acquired
pursuant to any section or sections of this chapter applicable to the
acquisition of land or interests there in, and for the settlement of claims
for damage resulting from the work of constructing, reconstructing and
maintaining such interstate highways.
64. Ontario Knitting Co. v. New York, 205 N.Y. 409, 98 N.E. 909 (1912).
65. Supra note 60 at 108, 180 N.Y.S.2d 287, 291 (1958).
66. Kahlen v. State of New York, 223 N.Y. 383, 119 N.E. 883 (1918).
67. People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 160 N.Y. 225, 54 N.E. 689, aff'd 176 U.S. 335
(1900); Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20.
68. People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., supra note 67.
69. State of Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1923).
70. Italics supplied.
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Plains.71 There is no indication that a route which would not require the
narrow strip of hospital lands, here in question, would be less practical, or
unreasonably inexpedient from the State's point of view. Again since a "short
cut" procedure for exercising the Superintendent's power, through map-filing
condemnation, is authorized by the amended highway statute,72 the Court's
construction of the "notwithstanding" language of section 340-b,78 seems not,
only grammatically correct, but also in harmony with a logical construction in
context. Similarly, such a construction attributes to the legislature the virtue of
reasonableness, an attribution often neglected through the use of rigid rules of
statutory construction.
IMPLIED EASEMENT
The plaintiff conveyed land to the defendant, describing the westerly
boundary as running "along the east boundary" of plaintiff's private road. An
injunction to prevent the defendant's use of the road was granted. Affirming
the Appellate Division and upholding the injunction, the Court of Appeals, 74
in a unanimous decision, found in Tarolli v. Westvale Genesee, Inc., that as a
matter of law no easement was to be implied from the description and other
relevant circumstances.
An easement is an interest in land which entitles the owner to a limited
use of the land of another. The law favors formality in the conveyance of an
easement although express words are not necessary so long as the intention
to give an easement is manifest.75 Where the intention is not manifest by the
language of the conveyance it may be possible-although the law does not
favor it-to imply an easement where there has been an original unity of
ownership in a common grantor of the parcels retained and conveyed,7 and
circumstances justify the inference that there was an intent to grant an ease-
ment in the portion retained in connection with a conveyance of a parcel of
the whole.77 To determine intent the court will take into consideration the
terms of the conveyance itself and the circumstances attending the transac-
tion.78 Where the deed describes the land as bounded by a road, the fee of
which is vested in the grantor, frequently the grantee by inference of an intent
71. N.Y. HIGHWAY LAW, § 34-a.
72. N.Y. HEIGnwAY LAW, § 30.
73. Supra note 63.
74. Tarolli v. Westvale Genesee, Inc., 6 A.D.2d 848, 175 N.Y.S.2d 521 (4th Dep't
1958), affirming Sup. Ct., Onondaga County, in a 3-2 decision. The dissenting opinion
contains a summary of the proof. Aff'd 6 N.Y.2d 32, 187 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1959).
75. Rubel Bros. v. Dumont Coal & Ice Co., Ill Misc. 658, 182 N.Y. Supp. 204,
(Sup. Ct. 1920), rev'd on other grounds 200 App. Div. 135, 192 N.Y.S. 705 (2d Dep't 1922),
dismissal of appeal denied 233 N.Y. 618, 135 N.E. 942 (1922).
76. Holtz Amusement Co. v. Schorr, 122 Misc. 712, 204 N.Y. Supp. 733 (Sup. Ct.
1924).
77. Miller v. Edmore Homes Corp., 285 App. Div. 837, 137 N.Y.S.2d 324 (2d Dep't
1955), 308 N.Y. 911, 127 N.E.2d 74 (1955).
78. Sabatino v. Vacarelli, 264 App. Div. 742, 35 N.Y.S.2d 725 (2d Dep't 1942);
Wilkinson v. Nassau Shores, 1 Misc. 2d 917, 86 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd 278
App. Div. 970, 105 N.Y.S.2d 984, reargued and appeal denied 279 App. Div. 591, 107
N.Y.S.2d 559 (2d Dep't 1951), aff'd 304 N.Y. 614, 107 N.E.2d 93 (1952).
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